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other man; his thirst for harmony passes into an active *will to create* harmony by punishing crime and restoring righteousness. Hamlet succumbs, but as conqueror: he leaves his place to Fortinbras, a man of known integrity. Thus, the essence of the tragedy is: the Hellenic soul through painful struggle and profound suffering (*i. e.*, through negative selection) attains to a higher form of integrity and perfection.

C. KUNTZ.

ISELIN, N. J.

The Limits of Genetic and of Comparative Psychology. MARY WHITON

CALKINS. *British Journal of Psychology*, January, 1905. Pp. 261-285.

This paper begins by distinguishing genetic from comparative psychology. Genetic psychology may or may not use the comparative method. Its distinctive feature is not its method, but that it treats its object as developing. This object is the conscious self. And development, as used here, is defined as 'the succession of more complex upon simpler states, or, conversely, of simpler upon more complex states of a unitary being.' 'Development, in the technical sense of evolutionary biology, can not possibly be predicated of conscious selves,' and heredity and natural selection have no possible application in such psychical development.

Turning to comparative psychology, the author discusses the 'continuity theory,' which holds consciousness to be a property of life, and the 'mechanistic theory,' which denies that organisms whose actions are unvaried reflexes are conscious. It is shown that neither has proved more than a possibility. 'Both agree in recognizing consciousness where there are adapted reactions.' Using this criterion, it will perhaps be found that all forms are conscious, and the field of comparative psychology 'is, after all, as wide as animal life.'

If we consider the nature of the consciousness of the different forms, the problem becomes more limited. "The minimal consciousness which an animal can be proved to have is the consciousness which accompanies the trial and error type of learning. . . . As parallel of the preliminary, random performances, there is no need to assume any save a sensational (and primitively affective) consciousness of the animal's environment and its own movements." The acquired reactions imply imagination, the animal reacts with purpose. Further, animals react only to concrete situations without analyzing them, they lack relational consciousness. And lastly, an animal, to be conscious at all, must be conscious of itself. But this does not mean that animals have attained such self-consciousness as reflective imitation involves.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. March, 1905. *La régularité universelle du devenir et les lois de la nature* (pp. 225-251): W. M. KOZŁOWSKI. — Uniformity of nature underlies induction. Regularity is a projection of